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Abstract: Solar storms that generate coronal mass ejections are a cause for concern due 
to the damage that they cause in high voltage power grids. Geomagnetically induced 
currents can be introduced onto the grid and cause many adverse effects. The 
vulnerability of the bulk electric power systems to such events has increased during the 
past few decades because the power system transmission lines have become more 
interconnected and have increased in length. Real and reactive power flows, voltage 
fluctuations, frequency shifts, undesired relay operations, higher order harmonic currents, 
undesired damage to assets and failure of assets are all possible outcomes from a large 
geomagnetic disturbance. A 100 year solar storm could cause mass blackouts and 
colossal damage to any high voltage power grid, if proper monitoring and mitigation 
techniques are not used. 
This thesis presents an in-depth background on geomagnetic disturbances and how they 
affect the electrical power grid. The thesis will model geomagnetic disturbances on a 
theoretical grid using the simulation software OpenDSS. The thesis will also discuss 
monitoring and mitigation techniques that can be applied to the power grid to lessen the 
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chance of failure or damage to assets, and analyze real world data collected from a 
Midwestern solar storm that had an effect on two power transformers equipped with online 
monitoring.   
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Reliable electrical power systems are something that most people in the United 
States take for granted. Every time you turn on a light switch, you expect the light to come 
on. The electrical power system has become so reliable that most utilities, especially 
Wisconsin Electric, brag about their percentage of uptime. Electrical power systems are 
vulnerable to widespread disturbances, which can be outside of the control of man. A 
popular example of this vulnerability is the March 13th, 1989 blackout where 6 million 
people were affected by one intense Geomagnetic Induced Current (GIC) event. Large 
scale outages, such as the example just listed, can have severe economic impacts. 
Understanding the vulnerability of the electric power system, monitoring GIC in systems 
and deploying a mitigation program can reduce negative impacts on the electric power 
system and reduce the likely hood of a large scale outage in the future.    
Geomagnetic storms are a major threat to the electrical power system. 
Geomagnetic storms are a temporary disturbance of the Earth’s Magnetosphere caused 
by a solar wind derived from a cloud of magnetic particles that have been discharged 
from the Sun which interact with the magnetic field around the Earth. The Magnetosphere 
of the Earth is compressed from the solar wind pressure. The transfer of energy, to the 
magnetosphere from the solar winds magnetic field, is caused by interactions of the 
plasma’s movement through the magnetosphere. 
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Figure 1 Earth's magnetic field interacting with solar activity [1]  
Coronal mass ejections are the major source of geomagnetic storms. Coronal 
mass ejections occur when the outer solar atmosphere violently releases gas and 
magnetic fields. A large coronal mass ejection can contain a billion tons of matter that can 
be accelerated to several million miles per hour. On average, a coronal mass ejection can 
travel from the sun to the Earth in approximately 98 hours, and can range in speed from 
200 kilometer per hour to 1000 kilometer per hour [2]. Intense geomagnetic storms with 
aurora electrojets of solar particles (1 million amperes or more) are the source of the 
aurora borealis and aurora australis. These intense geomagnetic storms also cause 
distortions in the Earth’s magnetic field that may interfere with communications and 
electrical power systems [3]. During periods of high solar activity, it is estimated that 50-
100 small to medium solar events occur each day; larger events that significantly affect 
communications occur weekly [4]. Solar activity has fairly predictable cycles, it peeks 
about every 11 years. The Earth is on the downward peak of solar cycle 24 [5], which 
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peaked during April of 2014 and is depicted in Figure 2. Even though we are past the 
peak of the cycles, the largest geomagnetic storms occur two to three years after cycle 
peaks [6]. 

Figure 2: Solar Cycle 24 [7] 
The intensity of geomagnetic storms is monitored by the Space Weather Prediction 
Center of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. The intensity of each 
geomagnetic store is rated on a logarithmic scale called the K-index. This scale quantifies 
disturbances in the horizontal component of the Earth’s magnetic field with a value of 0-
9, with nine being the most violent. The label K comes from the German work Kennziffer 
meaning “characteristic digit”. The K-index value is derived from the maximum 
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fluctuations of horizontal components observed on a magnetometer during a three hour 
interval. The Kp index may also be seen in solar storm references. The Kp index can be 
derived by calculating a weighted average of K indices form a network of geomagnetic 
observatories. Table 1 contains an overview of Kp values, frequency between 
occurrences, common issues associated with the storm, and severity.  
 
Table 1 NOAA Space Weather Scales [8] 
The eight daily K-index values can also be averaged to find the daily A-index.  
Geomagnetic field fluctuations are measured in units of nano-Tesla (nT).  	 
	  	
	To put this into relative terms, the Earth’s magnetic field at the 
poles is approximately equal to							  			.  
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The K-index is not a useful indicator of how intense a geomagnetic storm will 
impact electric utility systems. It does not account for the rate of change associated with 
the variation. For example, a K-9 geomagnetic storm with relatively fast variations will be 
more disruptive than a K-9 storm that slowly changes the Earth’s magnetic field. The 
Earth’s magnetic field fluctuations are a result from an electrical potential gradient of low 
frequency quasi-dc along the Earth surface, typically in an east to west direction. Quasi-
dc potentials exist in geoelectric fields, characterized by relatively slow time variation 
values of the same polarity. Quasi-dc potentials are also commonly referred to as Earth 
surface potentials. This potential gradient is a function of the Earth conductivity and the 
rate of change in the magnetic field. The greater the rate of change of this magnetic field, 
the greater the potential difference between two points on the Earth’s surface which will 
cause the greatest conditions to Geomagnetically induce currents in to the utility power 
system.  
Geomagnetic storms influence electric power systems by causing GIC’s to flow in 
power lines through the neutral of grounded wye transformers. In a grounded wye 
transformer, the common grounded neutral lead create the closed loop circuit in 
association with the Geo-Electric Field. A sample circuit that grounded wye transformers 
create is seen in Figure 3. Longer transmission lines typically see larger GIC, due to the 
size of the transmission line acting as a larger antenna for the GIC and having a larger 
area for the magnetic induction to act on. Electric utilities in the far northern latitudes 
typically see more GIC activity, due to their location in relation to the auroral electrojet 
currents.  

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Figure 3 Grounded Wye Transformer Circuit [9] 
The geology of the Earth also plays a key role in GIC activity. Since the current is 
being conducted through the neutral of the grounded wye through the Geo-Electric Field 
that of Earth, the conductivity of the region of the event can cause greater vulnerability to 
events. Figure 4 shows the different regions across the United States of America. For the 
purpose of this thesis, I will be focusing on the state of Wisconsin which consists of three 
different regions: The Interior Plains (Michigan) IP-3 Region, The Interior Plains (North 
Dakota) IP-1 Region and The Superior Upland SU-1 Region. The Resistivity per depth 
charts are located in   


Appendix.  
 
Figure 4 Map of USA resistivity [10] 
The Geomagnetically induced quasi-dc currents that flow through the grounded 
neutral of a transformer during a geomagnetic disturbance can cause the core or the 
transformer to magnetically saturate on alternate half cycles.  Saturated transformer cores 
cause harmonic distortions and creates additional reactive power or Volt Amp Reactance 
(VAR) demands on the electric power systems. This increase of VAR demands can lead 
to a reduction is system voltage and overloading of long transmission lines. Additionally, 
the compounding factor of harmonics to the system can cause protective relays to operate 
improperly and cause shunt capacitor banks to overload. Both the increase of VAR’s on 


the power distribution system and the addition of unwanted harmonics can have a 
cascading effect of damage which can cause major power failures.  
During the last two to three decades there has been a trend of smaller generation 
plants closing, and the ones that remain open adding extra generation capacity and 
operating closer to their limits. This creates a power transmission system that is operated 
closer to their upper limits, increasing the vulnerability to widespread geomagnetic 
disturbances. As more and more power is transmitted over longer distances to meet the 
grown demand [11], stability margins are further reduced. Projected continued growth in 
higher population load centers without corresponding growth in generation and 
distribution capacity and the public’s resistance to add new high capacity lines in large 
urban areas will further compound this issue in the future. If proper monitoring and 
mitigation techniques are not deployed over the power system, large scale outages could 
become more common in the near future.  
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The first recorded event of GIC having negative impacts on the electrical power 
system dates back to a solar storm on March 24th, 1940. VAR variations of up to 20% 
were recorded. Multiple transformers tripped offline as a result of this storm in the Maine 
and Ontario region of North America. New York City encountered VAR variations of up to 
10%. [12]. This event in 1940 triggered the start of recording and investigating the 
coloration of solar activity and its effects on the utility power system.  
The average activity on the sun has little effect on utility power systems. When 
activity rises above the G-1 level from Table 1, the cause for concern greatly rises, and 
utility power systems should heighten there awareness to the possibility of GIC activity. 
The greater the G scale event is, the higher the probability of unwanted damage from 
GIC.  
Geomagnetic storms can cause large variation in the Earth’s magnetic field which 
influences the Earth’s surface electric potential. The most severe geomagnetic storms 
can produce surface potentials that reach 				 and can last for several minutes. 
For comparison, the current in the global electrical circuit is approximately			 
		. [13] The induced voltages produce slowly oscillating GIC on the utility power 
systems that can be on the order of tens to hundreds of amperes, and have a frequency 
in the millihertz range. This unwanted GIC can have a huge impact on the bulk power 
system by saturating transformer cores and changing VAR flow causing large power 
fluctuations on the grid. If assets are not properly monitored and taken offline when high 
values of GIC are encountered, equipment failure or improper operation of equipment can 


cause large losses of assets to the utility power companies. The increased injection of 
harmonic currents into the system from saturated transformers can increase burden on 
static capacitors as well as interfere with operation of control and protection systems [14]. 
GIC in a grounded wye transformer can cause major damage. The presence of the 
quasi-dc GIC in the transformer windings causes a half cycle saturation or shift of the 
transformers operations range on the magnetization cure as seen in Figure 5 [15].  

Figure 5 Saturated Half Cycle Graph [16] 
 GIC in the transformer offset the magnetic flux. The offset magnetic flux causes a 
magnetizing current waveform with a greatly increased amplitude that is typically present 
on ether the positive or negative peaks of the AC wave form. When power transformers 

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are operated near capacity, even a small amount of saturation can push the unit outside 
of the design specifications causing premature failure or even catastrophic failure. When 
GIC in the transformer offsets the unwanted magnetic flux, one can typically see currents 
between 1-100 amperes from the grounded wye connection to the Earth’s ground. For 
comparison, power transformers in normal operations will have less than one ampere 
from the grounded wye connection to Earth’s ground.  
 VAR consumption by the transformer and an increase of harmonics generated by 
the half cycle saturations are unwanted side effects of GIC activity. Half cycle saturation 
of the transformer for an extended amount of time will cause stray flux to be introduced 
into the transformers structural tank members and current windings. When stray flux is 
found in the current windings, the windings will increase in temperature. The increase in 
temperature can cause many damaging side effects. It can cause damage to the 
insulation of the windings and leave permanent damage as seen in Figure 6 [17]. 
Unwanted overheating of the core can also cause an increase of gas content in the 
transformer. A Dissolved Gas Analyzer will be able to detect these key gasses in the 
transformer oil, but not in time to prevent any damage from occurring and hence is not a 
good way to mitigate damage to power transformers from GIC activity.    


 
Figure 6 Core Damage to Power Transformer Windings [18] 
During GIC events, load tap changing transformers can see increases of usage. 
Autotransformers on the bulk power system are fitted with mechanical load tap changers 
to compensate for the voltage fluctuations on the power grid, interconnecting different 
winding confirmations to buck or boost the voltage. When GIC events cause system 
voltage variations, caused by increased VAR demands, the load tap changing 
transformers will keep up with the requests to steady the voltage across the system. This 
causes unwanted wear of the tap changing device from the more than average operation 
of the device during a geomagnetic storm.  
GIC can cause relay and protection systems of the utility power systems to fail in 
three distinct ways. The first and most common failure mode of relaying and protection 
systems is due to GIC is when Static VAR compensators, capacitor banks and line relay 
operations can mistake harmonic currents produced by the saturation of transformers for 
a fault current overload. This may cause items to be pulled out of service when there truly 
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is not a problem and also may cause local outages in the bulk power system. The second 
and most severe failure mode for relays and protections systems due to GIC is when the 
relay fails to operate Current transformers, used to monitor load on transformers, can 
become distorted due to GIC activity and cause the protection scheme not to operate 
when there is a detected fault condition. This type of event causes the most damage to 
the bulk power system. The last type of failure mode for relay and protect systems of the 
utility power system is when GIC activity causes a delayed or slowed response of the 
protection device due to remnant flux in the current transformer. The remnant flux reduces 
the current transformers time to saturate, and my not present any signs of warning for 
days [19]. Differential relay schemes on transformers are particularly susceptible to GIC 
events and should not be used.  
Differential relay schemes that protect transformers are susceptible and are known 
to malfunction during GIC activity. Current transformer saturations and harmonics 
generated by the saturation for the power transformer cause the relay to fail to operate if 
there are simultaneous faults in the power transformer. Modern relays have increased 
their sensitivity to harmonics generated during transformer energization current inrush 
lessening the possibility of this failure mode, but many of the legacy equipment on our 
bulk power system are still susceptible to this type of failure if the relay equipment has 
not been upgraded in the past decade or two.  
GIC events can cause an increase of wear on utility power system circuit breakers. 
During GIC events, an increase in secondary arc currents inside the circuit breaker may 
occur, which is caused by the current that flows through a fault arc during and after a 
single line to ground fault caused by electromagnetic and electrostatic coupling from the 
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two energized phases. This increase in secondary arc current due to GIC may be as high 
as ten times normal operation. This increase of current causes difficulty extinguishing the 
arc contained in the circuit breaker. The time of which the circuit breaker trips and senses 
zero current is therefore increased causing the recovery time of circuit breakers to be 
longer than normal. In the United States, a re-closure typically tries three times before 
remaining fully open. The added time to sense zero current can cause altered readings. 
As a result, the re-closures will be prevented from actuating, remaining open and causing 
unwanted localized outages. 
Static VAR compensators installed in the bulk power system along with capacitor 
banks are becoming more common. When used in conjunction with each other they can 
rapidly control real and reactive power flow. Both are susceptible to GIC events and can 
be negatively impacted. A grounded wye connected capacitor bank can quickly trip out, 
for protection reasons, when excess current is detected on the path to Earth’s ground. 
Tripping the capacitor bank out of service will prevent the system experiencing excess 
voltage which can cause a cascading failure of the capacitor cans in the bank. When 
capacitor banks combined with SVC’s trip out, the bulk power system can see massive 
power fluctuations. The power fluctuations can cause damage to any item that is still 
actively connected to the bulk power system. This cascading effect has occurred in the 
past, as was the case in the large scale outage in 1989, and if proper monitoring and 
mitigation techniques are not applied to the system we all depend on, will occur again.  
The distribution system of the United States power system ultimately will see the 
outages generated by GIC events. The cascading effects of transformer, protection, SVC, 
capacitor banks being tripped offline, and distribution fuses blowing will cause unwanted 
	

short term outages. If proper monitoring and mitigation techniques are not deployed 
across the bulk power system, unwanted catastrophic failure of assets will happen 
causing the outages to last until the assets can be replaced which may take weeks to 
months. 
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GIC events can be modeled in simple dc circuits, due to their low frequency quasi-
dc nature, making bulk power system GIC mathematical modeling quite easy. Using the 
nodal admittance matrix method, one may convert the driving voltages to equivalent 
current sources. The following power network is comprised of nodes connected together 
and to ground. For a voltage source  and impedance	, the equivalent circuit has 
components    and	  , where 	is the admittance and 	is the current. A matrix 
solution is calculated for the voltage of each node, and the node voltages are then used 
to obtain the GIC in the network.  
To develop general equations for the nodal admittance matrix method, consider 
nodes  and  in the middle of the network in Figure 7. Here,  represents the admittance 
of the transmission line between nodes  and	, and  and  represent the admittances 
to ground from nodes  and  respectively.  

Figure 7: Modeling GIC using the nodal admittance matrix method [20] 
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
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Applying Kirchhoff’s current law, the equivalent equation for any node  will be in the form: 
   	 !  
The current in a transmission line is determined by the current source, the voltage 
differences between nodes of the transmission line and the admittance of the line. 
 " #$  $%   
Inserting Kirchhoff’s current law into the prior formula, the following is derived. 
 "#$  $%   

  
The total of the equivalent source currents directed into each node is as follows, and 
substituted into the prior.   
 	 &  
& "#$  $%    
The equation above involves the nodal voltages $ and the current to ground from each 
node  is unknown. The nodal voltage $ is related to the current to ground  by Ohm’s 
law so one can substitute for either $ or  to obtain equations involving only one set of 
unknowns. In this derivation we will make the following substitution.  
  $ 
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
Substituting  gives the following equation only involving the node voltage $ as the 
unknown: 
& "#$  $%  $  
Or: 
&  $ "	$ $

  
The prior formula may be converted in matrix form: 
'	&	(  '	)	(	'		( 
 
Using the prior matrix form, the following theoretical six bus system can by analyzed using 
GPS coordinates throughout the state of Wisconsin. 
 

Figure 8 Six Bus Example Power System [20] 
 
Tables 2 through 4 contain required data to calculate estimated GIC.  
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Name Latitude Longitude 
Grounding 
Resistance 
(Ohms) 
Sub 1 46.554666 -90.990730 0.2 
Sub 2 43.113731 -89.232048 0.2 
Sub 3 43.019590 -88.040024 0.2 
Table 2 Example Substation locations and ground grid resistance 
 
Line From Bus 
To 
Bus 
Length  
(km) 
Resistance 
(Ohms/Phase) 
1 2 3 407 4.334 
2 4 5 97 4.028 
Table 3 Example Transmission line information 
 
Name Resistance W1 (Ohm/Phase) 
Resistance W2 
(Ohm/Phase) 
T1 0.5 N/A 
T2 0.2 (Series) 0.2 (Common) 
T3 0.5 N/A 
Table 4 Example Transformer and Autotransformer Winding Resistance Values 
 
One must properly calculate the distance between two points to accurately derive the 
estimated GIC. It is necessary to take into account the latitude for the substation when 
converting its longitudinal separation into the distance due to the ellipsoidal shape of the 
Earth. Using the WGS84 model, the ellipsoidal model of the Earth is used and distances 
will be more accurately calculated.  
 
Parameter Symbol Value 
Equatorial 
Radius A 6378.137 km 
Polar Radius B 6356.752 km 
Eccentricity 
squared E
2 0.00669437999014 
Table 5 Parameter of the WGS84 Earth Model 


 
The North-South distance is given by: 
 
*  +,	- . /*0 
 
M is equal to the radius of the curvature in the meridian plane and is calculated by the 
following formula: 
- 	 1	#  2%#  32	24%  
 
4  	*01 " *056  
 
Substituting values from Table 5, the North South distance in kilometers can be 
calculated.  
 *  #77  	8 9:;#64%% . 	/*0 
 /*0 is the difference in latitude in degrees between the two substations A and B.  
 
 
 
Similarly the East-West distance is given by: 
 
*< 	 +,	=	>?4 . /*? 
 


=  	 1@  32	24 
 
Substituting the values from Table 5, the following formula is derived for East-West 
distances in kilometers. 
 *<  #	8  	,6 9:;#64%% . 9:;	4 . 	/*?	  
 
Line From Bus To Bus Northward Distance (km) 
Eastward 
Distance (km) 
1 2 3 -382.387 138.078 
2 4 5 -10.459 97.103 
Table 6 Example Eastward and Northward distance calculation results 
 
Assuming an electrical field magnitude of 		 with an Eastward direction, Table 7 
was calculated using: 
 3	AAAB?	*	AAAB  	3C*C "	3D*D 
 
Where 3	AAAB	is the geoelectric field at the location of the transmission line and *	AAAB	is the 
incremental length vector. 
Line From Bus 
To 
Bus 
Induced 
Voltage 
(Volts) 
1 2 3 1380.78 
2 4 5 971.03 
Table 7 Example Induced Voltage Calculations 
 
The next step is to construct an equivalent circuit of the system as shown in Figure 9. 
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Figure 9 Example Equivalent Circuit of System [20] 
 
The circuit in Figure 9 can be solved as is, but it is more convenient to perform the 
calculations using nodal analysis where the voltage sources are converted to current 
sources and all impedance elements are converted to their equivalent admittances as 
seen in Figure 10.  
 
 
Figure 10 Example Circuit of system in Nodal Form [20] 
 
The admittance matrix of the circuit shown in Figure 10 can be constructed as is shown 
in the following formula. 
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) 
EF
FFF
FFF
G 7HI " 7HJ " 7HK  7HK 	 	 7HK 7HL " 7HK " 7HM " 7HJ2  7HL 		  7HL 7HL " 7HK2  7HK2	 	  7HK2 7HIN " 7HK2 " 7HK2OP
PPP
PPP
Q
 
 
Substituting the values into the prior matrix, the following matrix is calculated. 
 
)  R 7, 	8S6 	 		8S6 STT6  		  T 	T	 	 	T 7T6 UV? 
 
The current vector can be calculated using the nodal currents as shown in the following 
matrix. 
W  RWK WK WK2WK2 U 
 
Nodal current injections can be found using the following equations: 
 
WK  7	K HK  	S,	X 
 
WK2  7	K2HK2  676	X 
 
Using Ohms Law, the node voltages are calculated. 
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  ')(
 W  	 R	6, 		7S 		7, 			,		7S 	6	 	S, 		T6		7, 	S 	6T 					, 		T6 		T 	6SSU	R
S,S,676676 U 	 	 R
6,6ST,7,,		6	S8,6 U 
 
The three phase GIC flow is calculated using the various relationships derived from the 
circuit. The following calculations can further be divided by three to obtain the per phase 
GIC flow.  
 
WI 	 Y 7HI " 7HJ Z  	86	X 
 
W 2 	 WK " #  2% Y 7HK Z  78T	T	X 
 
WL 	 #N  2 % Y 7HLZ  8886	X 
 
WM 	2 Y 7HM " 7HJ2Z  ,S7	X 
 
WN[ 	 WK2 " #N  [% Y 7HK2Z  7	7	X 
 
WIN 	[ Y 7HIN " 7HJNZ  ,8	X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 The mathematical modeling of GIC is a fairly simple process as seen in Chapter 3 
Mathematical Modeling of GIC. When the system becomes large (more than a few nodes) 
the system matrix becomes very large quite quickly. Computer simulations can make the 
calculations required for analyzing a large complex system with many nodes an easy 
process. One option for a computer simulation of GIC is a free simulation tool developed 
by the Electrical Power Research Institute called OpenDSS.  
 The OpenDSS is a comprehensive electrical power system simulation tool 
primarily for electric utility power distribution systems. It supports nearly all frequency 
domain (sinusoidal steady\state) analyses commonly performed on electric utility power 
distribution systems. In addition, it supports many new types of analyses that are 
designed to meet future needs related to smart grid, grid modernization, and renewable 
energy research. The OpenDSS tool has been used since 1997 in support of various 
research and consulting projects requiring distribution system analysis. Many of the 
features found in the program were originally intended to support the analysis of 
distributed generation interconnected to utility distribution systems and that continues to 
be a common use. Other features support analysis of such things as energy efficiency in 
power delivery and harmonic current flow. The OpenDSS is designed to be indefinitely 
expandable so that it can be easily modified to meet future needs.
 The example circuit from Chapter 3 will be used for the following simulation using 
OpenDSS. 
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
 
Figure 11 Example Three-Phase Equivalent Circuit [20] 
Name Latitude Longitude 
Grounding 
Resistance 
(Ohms) 
Sub 1 46.554666 -90.990730 0.2 
Sub 2 43.113731 -89.232048 0.2 
Sub 3 43.019590 -88.040024 0.2 
Table 8 Example Substation locations and ground grid resistance 
 
Line From Bus 
To 
Bus 
Length  
(km) 
Resistance 
(Ohms/Phase) 
1 2 3 407 4.334 
2 4 5 97 4.028 
Table 9 Example Transmission line information 
 
Name Resistance W1 (Ohm/Phase) 
Resistance W2 
(Ohm/Phase) 
T1 0.5 N/A 
T2 0.2 (Series) 0.2 (Common) 
T3 0.5 N/A 
Table 10 Example Transformer and Autotransformer Winding Resistance Values 
 
Note: OpenDSS does not take into account the ellipsoidal shape of the Earth in its 
computation as described in the Chapter 3 Mathematical Modeling of GIC.  

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The OpenDSS simulation has three main components. First, the transmission line 
models are generated use a quasi-dc voltage, computed internally using Faraday’s Law. 
The line of code for transmission line 1 follows: 
 
Figure 12 Example OpenDSS Transmission Line Input 
 
Figure 13 OpenDSS Transmission Line Model [20] 
The second component required for GIC simulations with OpenDSS is the 
Transformer Model. There are three options available for the Model; Delta-Grounded Wye 
(GSU), Grounded-Wye Grounded Wye (with or without delta tertiary) and Grounded Why 
Autotransformers (with or without delta tertiary). Only connections to ground are included 
in the model, delta and ungrounded wye windings are excluded. For the simulations we 
will use an Autotransformer and two GSU’s.  
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Figure 14 Example OpenDSS Autotransformer Input 
 
Figure 15 OpenDss Autotransformer Circuit [20] 
 
 
Figure 16  Example OpenDSS GSU Input 


 
Figure 17 OpenDSS GSU Model [20] 
After entering all the parameters and running the code (Appendix B OpenDss Code with 
Results), the results were generated. Figure 18 depicts the simulated transmission lines 
in relation to the arbitrarily chosen GPS coordinates in the state of Wisconsin. The 
arbitrary GPS coordinates represent the bulk power system in Wisconsin, per available 
maps published by The America Transmission Company. The simulation used a 
calculated average ground resistivity derived from the resistive values from Figure 25, 
Figure 26 and Figure 27 in . If this simulation was run for the same equipment, 
but in a different geographical location, the resistivity of the new location would have to 
be taken into consideration.  
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Figure 18 OpenDSS GIC Simulation with Map 
 
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 The Total GIC Susceptibility of utility power assets is a complicated topic. Design, 
location, age, life expectancy and many others factors need to be taken into consideration 
to approximate the susceptibility that power transformers and other bulk power system 
assets will be damaged during GIC events. The treatment or replacement of expensive 
assets and application of mitigation techniques are costly and sometimes unneeded. 
Having each individual asset thermally tested for susceptibility can be avoided if general 
asset screenings are performed to a power utility’s fleet. Higher voltage transformers 
maybe exposed to higher levels of GIC, and are costly to repair. The cost to monitor is 
just a fraction of the replacement cost of the asset. It is in the best interest of the power 
utility to monitor expensive assets to prevent unnecessary damage during GIC activity. 
Transformers greater than 200 kV on the primary should be monitored for GIC 
susceptibility regardless of condition or location due to the cost to replace if damaged 
[21].  
 The evaluation of the susceptibility of a transformer to the effects of GIC can be 
completed in multiple steps. The first step is to determine the susceptibility of the 
transformer based solely on its design. The second step of the evaluation process is to 
consider the location and the expected levels of exposure to GIC. Combining design 
information and the GIC level susceptibility information is critical to determine the Total 
Susceptibility of a transformer to effects of GIC [22]. A susceptible design type may be 
located in an area where the expected levels of GIC are low, therefore the Total GIC 


Susceptibility of the transformer would be much lower than that indicated by only its 
design.  
A fleet of transformers can be divided into the following categories to define its design 
based susceptibility classification to the effects of GIC:  
Classification-A: Transformers not susceptible to effects of the GIC  
Classification-B: Transformers least susceptible to core saturation but 
susceptible to high magnetizing current. 
Classification-C: Transformers susceptible to core saturation and possible 
structural parts overheating.  
Classification-D: Transformers susceptible to core saturation as well as possible 
damaging windings and structural parts overheating. 
The evaluation of the Design – Based susceptibility may consider the following key 
electrical parameters and core and winding design of a transformer. 
Transformer winding design:  
• If the HV winding of the transformer is connected in delta, the transformer is not 
susceptible to GIC and may be considered to be in Classification A.  
• In transformers with core types other than the three-phase, three-limb core, if the 
LV winding of the transformer is delta-connected, or if the transformer has a delta 
connected tertiary winding the transformer may be susceptible to possible 
significant winding overheating and should be considered to be in Classification 
D.  
  


Transformer type: 
 
Figure 19 Core DC flux path in various core types [7] 
• Three-phase core form transformer with a three-limb core has lower susceptibility 
to core saturation but it is susceptible to high levels of magnetizing current and 
tank heating may be considered to be in Classification B.  
• Transformers with core types other than the three-phase three-limb core, using a 
T-beam (shell 1 form), or near-core flitch-plates or tie-rods (core form) are 
susceptible to core saturation and structural parts overheating and may be 
considered to be in Classification C.  


• Transformers with core types other than the three phase three limb cores with 
magnetic steel bolts through the core limbs or yokes are susceptible to 
overheating of core bolts during core saturation and may be considered in 
Classification D.  
• Some of the pre–1970 shell form designs could be susceptible to appreciable 
winding overheating due to high circulating currents in the low voltage windings 
when the core saturates and may be considered to be in Classification D.  
For power transformers designs not mentioned in the criteria above, a full assessment 
should be performed to determine the susceptibility of the design to GIC activity.  
 The GIC level-based assessment represents the other part in the process of 
evaluating the Total Susceptibility of a transformer. As stated in the above, the Total 
Susceptibility of a transformer cannot be accurately analyzed without considering the 
level of GIC the transformer may be exposed to. This level of GIC is determined by a 
number of factors, such as the region where the transformer is located, the resistance of 
the soil in that location, and other factors. These items have been discussed in Chapter 
2. The process of evaluating the GIC Level–Based susceptibility divides transformers into 
three exposure categories; 
• High (greater than 75 amperes per phase)  
• Medium (greater than 15 amperes per phase but less than 75 amperes per 
phase)  
• Low (less than 15 amperes per phase).  
	
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These categories may be determined using calculated relative levels of GIC that 
transformers in a certain location, and would be subjected to for the benchmark GMD 
storm. 
 The process of assessing the Total Susceptibility of a transformer to GIC events 
combine the results of the Design – Based Susceptibility Assessment analysis and the 
GIC Level–Based Susceptibility Assessment.  
• Transformers assessed to have a high level of Total Susceptibility to GIC effects 
(Category IV) are those which belong to design classification D and are, at the 
same time, located in high or medium GIC level areas. For this group of 
transformers, both magnetic and thermal GIC capability (winding hotspot and 
structural parts hotspot) evaluation may be considered.  
• Transformers assessed to have a medium level of Total Susceptibility to effects 
of GIC (Category III) are those which are determined to be either in Design 
Classification B or C and are located in high GIC level areas. For this group of 
transformers, both magnetic modeling and thermal assessment of structural parts 
may be performed.  
• Transformers assessed to have a low Total Susceptibility to effects of GIC 
(Category II) are those which are determined to belong to Design Classification B 
or C and are located in medium GIC level areas. For this group of transformers, 
only magnetic modeling may be performed.  
• Transformers assessed to have practically no susceptibility to effects of GIC 
(Classification A) are those which are determined to be either:  
I) Design Classification B or C and are located in low GIC level areas, or  



II) Design Classification A 
• For Category 1, no further action may be considered. 
Due to the nature of this thesis, it is important to note here that identifying a group of 
transformers to be highly susceptible to winding or structural parts overheating does not 
imply that these transformers will experience this overheating. It only identifies those 
transformers that need detailed thermal assessment. Table 11 is a summary of Category 
versus GIC Exposure Level Classification. 
Classification of Transformer 
Design Based Susceptibility 
Low 
Exposure 
(≤15 A) 
Medium 
Exposure  
(>15 to 75 A) 
High 
Exposure 
(>75 A) 
Not Susceptible (A) 1 1 1 
Least Susceptible (B) 1 2 3 
Susceptible (C) 2 3 3 
Highly Susceptible (D) 2 4 4 
Table 11 Transformer Total Susceptibility to the Effects of GIC in Amperes per 
Phase 
 After the susceptibility of the assets are calculated, the utility industry may choose 
appropriate actions to take to prevent damage from GIC. If the Transformer Total 
Susceptibility is greater than two, online monitoring can be installed. Online monitoring 
can take measurements of GIC on assets around the clock, making the tripping of assets 
offline in the quickest time causing the least amount of damage.  
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 Future GIC events are going to have an effect on the bulk power system. Massive 
blackouts and costly damage to utility assets are some of the major risks that we face. 
One way to prevent this is to establish specific parameters and performance 
characteristics for power transformers to help minimize the risk and impact that GIC may 
cause when events occur effecting the bulk power system.  
 Monitoring GIC activity of transformers is relatively easy. Hall Effect sensors are a 
non-intrusive CT that can be installed on the neutral conductor to measure both ac and 
dc currents. Hall Effect sensors are available in split core designs to make retrofitting a 
GIC monitoring solution on a transformer simple. A short outage on the assets may be 
required if safety clearances to the high voltage energized lines must be breached. The 
split core Hall Effect sensor design does not required disconnecting any cabling to install.  
 Monitoring the cause for the damage from GIC flow through the neutral conductor 
to ground is the approach that will prevent the most amount of damage to utility assets. 
Other options that monitor the effects caused by GIC, such as increased transformer 
saturation current, increased VAR consumption, harmonic content of the saturation 
current, transformer overheating, tank wall overheating and DGA results are unable to 
trip the transformer offline prior to the damage occurring. Harmonic measurements, while 
able to monitor GIC, are only able to make measurements once the transformer’s core 
has undergone half-cycle saturation. By this time irreversible damage may have occurred. 
Monitoring the GIC flow through the neutral conductor can trip a transformer offline prior 
to the damage that harmonics may cause.  
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
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Figure 20 Response time of Dynamic Ratings Hall Effect Sensor  
 The Dynamic Ratings Inc. GIC sensor has a very good response time at 8	] as 
depicted in Figure 20. The sensors are installed on the neutral conductor to ground prior 
to any grounded restraints of the cable or bus bar. An example installation is shown in 
Figure 21. The red circle is the Hall Effect sensor. It is installed as close to the neutral 
bushing as possible and the conductor is centered in the sensor. 
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Figure 21 Dynamic Ratings GIC Sensor Installed on Transformer 
 Starting on April 21st 2015, large concentrations of solar winds were ejected from 
a coronal mass ejection. Three distinct CME’s were the source of concentrated solar 
winds and caused an injection of electrically charged particles into the Earth’s 
magnetosphere. The individual events caused geomagnetic disturbances around the 
world. Three recorded instances occurred on June 21 at 16:45 UT, June 22 at 5:45 UT 
and June 22 at 18:30 UT. By standard measures, this magnetic solar storm was the 
second largest of the present solar cycle. As is typical for magnetic storms, activity was 
particularly intense at high latitudes. At the USGS Barrow observatory in northern Alaska, 
for example, the direction of the Earth’s magnetic field fluctuated by almost 10 degrees in 
less than an hour. You could actually measure the effect of this storm on a simple 
compass [23]. The aurora borealis were seen across Alaska, Canada and in many states 
in the lower continental United States as far south as North Carolina, Georgia and Texas. 

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The results of this event reached sever G4 levels on the National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration’s space weather scale.  
 
Figure 22 NOAA June 23, 2015 Aurora Forecast [24] 
 After the arrival at Earth of the third CME, data from NASA’s Advanced 
Composition Explorer satellite indicates that the solar wind’s interplanetary magnetic field 
was southward directed. The southward orientation is optimal for connection of the 
interplanetary magnetic field onto geomagnetic field lines. Once this connection occurred, 
the magnetosphere was effectively opened up to the solar wind allowing electrically 
charged energetic particles to be deposited into the magnetotail, or the main source of 
the polar aurora, and into the westward-flowing equatorial ring current of the inner 
magnetosphere. This storm saw a maximum –195 nT on June 23 at about 04:30 UT. 

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 The conditions were all in favor for large GIC events occurring in the bulk power 
system in northern parts of North America. Two transformers, with Dynamic Ratings GIC 
sensors, were online collecting data throughout the time period of the storms. In Figure 
23, the recorded GIC amperage results are graphed. One can clearly see the peaks of 
the three distinct events.  
 
Figure 23 Dynamic Ratings GIC Sensor Readings June 21-24 
 The two assets, with Dynamic Ratings GIC monitoring, were in the Midwest of the 
United States and were clearly showing signs of GIC activity. The Transformer T1 asset 
was located further north and experience a higher value GIC because it was located 
inside the predicted area of high activity from Figure 22. Transformer T1 experienced 
short bursts of ^			X_	on multiple occasions during the second of the two events. 
As discussed in   
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Chapter 5 Evaluation of Susceptibility of Power Transformers, both transformers have a 
susceptibility of greater than three. Both assets should be monitored closely due to their 
location and probability of being effected by solar storms in the future. Luckily, this was a 
short lived event and the asset presented no signs of damage caused by GIC.  
 To further investigate this storm, this thesis will also investigate the dissolved gas 
analyzer recordings to see if this event caused any internal gassing. Transformer T1 has 
a Morgan Schaffer Calisto 9 installed for online monitoring purposes. As mentioned in 
prior chapters, a dissolved gas analyzer will only trigger alarms after the damage to the 
asset has occurred. The off gassing is a result of the damage to the transformer. Using 
Morgan Schafer’s program Calisto Manager, the historical data was analyzed for key gas 
increases. See Table 12 in Appendix C for more information on what causes key gases 
in power transformers. Figure 24 shows the DGA recordings from April – August 2015. 
Any key gases released in the transformer may take a week or two to circulate through 
to the DGA device. The results do not indicate that any Partial Discharge or thermal 
damage from harmonics occurred from the result of the GIC.  
 Although tripping a transformer offline may cause outages, it is the best way to 
protect transformers from internal damage from GIC. Due to the varying degrees of 
susceptibility, age, location and importance of the asset, the tripping trigger can vary 
greatly. If the asset is declared a critical infrastructure piece of equipment, than greater 
care must be taken to comply with the North American Electrical Reliability Corporation’s 
Critical Infrastructure Protection program.  

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Figure 24 Transformer T1 DGA Recording after GIC Event 
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 The bulk power system is operated using what is termed the N-1 operation 
criterion. This N-1 criteria deems that the system must always be operated to withstand 
the next credible disturbance contingency without causing a cascading collapse of the 
system as a region or whole. GIC events cause almost simultaneous events that impact 
the bulk power system over a wide area.  
Tripping from just high current values from GIC events will protect the asset. When 
tripping from current over time or current combined with thermal and other sensor inputs, 
the asset experiencing GIC will be able to remain in service as long as possible prior to 
any damage occurring. This is a key factor for preventing nuisance alarms, and causing 
unnecessary outages breaking the N-1 operation criteria.  
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 This thesis intends to raise the issue of geomagnetic phenomenon as a potential 
disturbance to the bulk power system. A systematic approach was used to bring notice of 
how susceptible the system actually is and how many different ways it can be effected 
from one GIC event. This was achieved by studying the events that cause GIC, 
mathematically modeling GIC, simulating GIC and discussing monitoring and 
investigating real world data from a local event. If proper monitoring and mitigation 
techniques are not rolled out system wide, we will see cascading outages like we have in 
the past.  
 More field research must be conducted to come up with a valid monitoring and 
mitigation process for each case. Contingency plans must be developed to maintain the 
N-1 operation criteria. NERC and IEEE have all identified the issues discussed in this 
thesis and are actively developing new guidelines so new products are designed with GIC 
failure modes identified and lessened as much as possible. Guides for assessing 
susceptibility of assets will be published by IEEE in the near future. Hopefully NERC CIP 
will eventually publish regulations that must be abided by to prevent GIC events causing 
large scale outages in the future, but until then any utility can actively create their own 
monitoring and mitigation programs to prevent damage to their costly assets. 
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Figure 25 Interior Plains IP-3 Resistivity Graph [10] 
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Figure 26 Interior Plains IP-1 Resistivity Graph [10] 
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Figure 27 Superior Upland SU-1 Resistivity Graph [10] 
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OpenDSS code for simulation; 
Clear 
New circuit.GICtest 
 
!GIC Line Data 
New GICLine.1 bus1=1 bus2=2 R=4.334 Lat1=46.554666 Lon1=-90.990730 Lat2=43.113731 
Lon2=-89.232048 EE=10.00 EN=0.00 
New GICLine.2 bus1=3 bus2=4 R=4.028 Lat1=43.113731 Lon1=-89.232048 Lat2=43.019590 
Lon2=-88.040024 EE=10.00 EN=0.00 
 
 
!GIC Transformer Data 
New GICTransformer.T1 busH=1 busNH=1.4.4.4 R1=0.5 type=GSU 
New GICTransformer.T2 busH=3 busX=2 busNX=3.4.4.4 R1=0.2 R2=0.2 type=Auto 
New GICTransformer.T3 busH=4 busNH=4.4.4.4 R1=0.5 type=GSU 
 
 
!Substation Ground Grid Data 
New Reactor.SUB1gnd phases=1 bus1=1.4 R=0.200 X=0 
New Reactor.SUB2gnd phases=1 bus1=3.4 R=0.200 X=0 
New Reactor.SUB3gnd phases=1 bus1=4.4 R=0.200 X=0 
 
 
!Perform analysis 
Set frequency=0.1 
 
Solve 
 
!Load file with bus coordinates, used for plotting 
LatLongCoords LatLonFile.csv   
Show Current Elements 
Show Transformer Elements 
plot circuit Current Max=70 dots=y labels=y subs=n C1=$00FF0000 
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OpenDSS simulation generated results; 
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Figure 28 OpenDSS Simulation GICLine1 
 
Figure 29 OpenDSS Simulation GICLine2 
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Table 12 DGA Gas Interpretation [25] 
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Figure 30 T1 Transformer DGA History Long 
